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Populist Rhetorical Strategies in the Courts of Classical 
Athens 
 
By Vasileios Adamidis  
 
The elusive populist phenomenon has been the focus of numerous studies in recent years, with the 
reliance of populism on divisive and aggressive rhetoric being acknowledged. The paper aims to 
apply these findings to the Athenian forensic rhetoric and identify manifestations of populist 
rhetoric in the antagonistic arena of Athenian courts. By reference to the most ‘political’ of public 
trials, namely the indictments against inexpedient laws and illegal decrees, it is argued that the 
rhetorical strategies employed by the Athenian litigants who sought to persuade mass audiences in 
a zero-sum process, have much in common with modern populist discourse. Aiming to secure the 
good will of the dicasts, speakers competed over their level of adherence to the shared traditional 
values and norms of Athenian society, making the audience the nodal point of their rhetoric. 
Artfully interpellating the audience into a fictitiously pure and homogeneous group, litigants 
sought to establish concord with the dicasts while alienating the opponent. The division between the 
pure demos and the corrupt establishment, allowed the speakers to use a divisive and aggressive 
rhetoric, through which the adversary was presented as an outsider, representative of the out-group 
of corrupt political elite who undermined the political and moral principles upon which the 
Athenian identity was based. 
 
 
Populism is an essentially contested concept that is hard to define1. It has 
been classified, inter alia, as ideology2, strategy3, political logic4, rhetoric5, and 
                                                          
Principal Lecturer, Nottingham Trent University, UK. 
1. For the definition of ‘essentially contested concepts’ see W.B. Gallie, ‚Essentially 
Contested Concepts,‛ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, no. 1 (1956): 169. For 
populism as an ‘essentially contested concept’ see Cas Mudde, ‚Populism: An Ideational 
Approach,‛ in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, edited by C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, 
P. Ochoa Espejo, P. Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 27-47. 
2. For populism as an ideology, see Cas Mudde, ‚The Populist Zeitgeist,‛ Government 
and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 543; Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens, ‚Populism versus 
Democracy,‛ Political Studies 55, no. 2 (2007): 405-424; Ben Stanley, ‚The Thin Ideology of 
Populism,‛ Journal of Political Ideologies 13, no. 1 (2008): 95-110; Cas Mudde and Cristobal 
Rovira Kaltwasser ‚Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,‛ in 
Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, edited by Cas 
Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
1–26. 
3. Kurt Weyland, ‚Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin 
American Politics,‛ Comparative Politics 34, no. 1 (2001): 14. For populism as a strategy, see 
Robert R. Barr, ‚Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics,‛ Party Politics 15, no. 
1 (2009): 29-48. 
4. Ernesto Laclau, The Populist Reason, (London: Verso, 2005). 
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discourse6. Promises of power for the many, not for the few (members of the 
elite), are increasingly present in modern political discourse and shape the 
ideological framework, especially, of liberal democracies. Despite the true beliefs 
and objectives of populist leaders, rhetoric is their main vehicle for mobilizing the 
masses and persuading large audiences about the sincerity of their intentions. 
Populist rhetoric is predominantly an appeal that pits the (often marginalized and 
discontented) pure ‘People’, the common citizens, against an out-group, often 
loosely defined ‘establishment’, ‘elite’ or oligarchy’7. The focus of this type of 
rhetoric lies on the mode of political expression evident in text, speech, and 
performance, which might eventually, allow populists to dominate the political 
field and monopolize the political discourse.  
Populist rhetoric is divisive, antagonistic, anti-pluralist, and often aggressive8. 
Its strategic objective is the effective manipulation of the People’s thoughts and 
emotions, by artfully interpellating them as a homogeneous group with 
putatively common identity and interests, whose just demands and rights are 
denied by the establishment and the ruling elite. This is an artificial construction, 
at best referring to a specific interpretation (and simplification) of reality.9 The 
tactics used to implement this strategy are, initially, to interpellate the fictional 
group of ‘pure’ People, who are often described as (or feeling) vulnerable, by 
creating bonds between them through the cultivation of a shared identity by 
reference to common values10. The People are, subsequently, pitted against an 
equally fictional and oversimplified Corrupt and Voracious Elite, separating the 
two groups by creating clear boundaries, binaries, and dichotomies.  
                                                                                                                                                         
5. Martin Reisigl, ‚Analyzing Political Rhetoric,‛ in Qualitative Discourse Analysis in 
the Social Sciences, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
6. Kirk A. Hawkins, ‚Is Chavez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in 
Comparative Perspective,‛ Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 8 (2009): 1040-1067; Carlos 
De La Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010); 
Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). For 
populism as style, which takes in both the rhetorical and the aesthetic aspects of populist 
communication, rather than merely discourse, see Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of 
Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press: 2016). 
7 See, for example, Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‚Studying 
Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future 
Research Agenda,‛ Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 2 (2018): 1669. 
8 Populism is anti-pluralistic as illustrated by Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2016). 
9 Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism. A Very Short 
Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017): 9. 
10 See Margaret Canovan, ‚Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of 
Democracy,‛ in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, edited by Yves Mény and Yves 
Surel (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 26. 
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The aim of this paper is to trace manifestations of populist rhetorical 
strategies in the classical Athenian forensic speeches. The antagonistic nature of 
the Athenian administration of justice and the need to persuade large audiences 
of Athenian citizens sitting and judging in the courts, created the ideal forum for 
the implementation of populist strategies. In particular, the main focus will be on 
the most ‘political’ of legal actions, namely the actions against inexpedient laws 
and illegal proposals. It will be shown that litigants consciously aim to establish 
concord with the homogeneous group of judges-People, which is the nodal point 
of their rhetoric, by demonstrating their adherence to common values and shared 
norms. Judges are presented as the embodiment of the eternal, transcendent 
Athenian demos. Subsequently, this interpellation of the Athenian judges-People 
and the identification of the speaker with them11, forms the basis for the alienation 
of the opponent, who is presented as an outsider, disrespectful of Athenian 
values, enemy of the People, the laws, and the democracy12. 
 
 
Securing the Good Will of the Audience 
 
In the antagonistic setting of Athenian courtrooms, litigants strove to win at 
all costs. Despite the (sometimes, unclear and flexible) rules and procedures of 
Athenian law promoting a more objective administration of justice13, securing the 
good will of the audience was crucial14. From the prooemium to the epilogue, 
speakers aimed at establishing concord with their hearers15, simultaneously 
undermining their opponent’s credibility. According to Aristotle, this good will 
may reach its climax and imitate ‘friendship’ and, with the speaker’s aggressive 
and antipluralist prompting, the audience is induced to more passionate and 
partial responses.16 Although this was prohibited by the Heliastic oath taken by 
                                                          
11. For examples of such identification of the speaker with the audience, see Dem. 
18.281, 287, 292-3; 20.4, 14; 23.6, 163-6, 173-4, 184, 194; 24.24, 38. 
12. Vasileios Adamidis, Character Evidence in the Courts of Classical Athens: 
Rhetoric, Relevance and the Rule of Law, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 
chapter 5. 
13. Edward M. Harris, The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
14. On securing the good will (eunoia) of the audience, see Adamidis, Character 
Evidence, 209. Reference to public services (liturgies) was also an evidently effective tactic 
to ask for the gratitude (charis) or for the good will of the people, see Vasileios Adamidis, 
‚The Relevance of Liturgies in the Courts of Classical Athens,‛ Athens Journal of History 3, 
no. 2 (2017): 85-96. 
15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1167a−b; Aristotle Rhetoric 1378a19; cf. Arist. Nic. 
Eth. 1166b33 where good will is described as ‘less intense philia’; William Fortenbaugh, 
‚Aristotle on Persuasion through Character‛, Rhetorica, 10, no. 3 (1992): 219−220. 
16. For a study of such responses in the courts, see Victor Bers, ‚Dikastic Thorubos‛, 
History of Political Thought 6, no. 1/2 (Summer 1985): 1-15. 
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all Athenian judges (Dem. 24.151), the mere presence of such a clause reveals the 
existence of the problem. The most characteristic example comes from a speech 
delivered by Apollodorus (Dem. 45) against Stephanus for false testimony. 
Apollodorus says that his opponent  
 
‚made such an impression on the jury that they refused to hear a single word 
from me: I was fined one sixth of the amount claimed, was denied the right 
of a hearing, and was treated with such contumely as I doubt if any other 
man ever was, and I went from the court, men of Athens, taking the matter 
bitterly and grievously to heart.‛17  
 
Although such episodes may be described as ‚aberrations from the norm‛ 
where the court ‚have yielded to emotional appeals and failed to perform their 
duty of upholding the law‛18, they nonetheless highlight the untypical emergence 
of passionate good will towards one of the parties, leading to antipluralism and 
reaching the extent of prejudice. In order to achieve this end, litigants resorted to 
strategies which, in modern discourse, could be described as ‘populist’. These 
include the interpellation of the audience (the People) in a single, homogeneous, 
group by reference to common shared values, flattering them as pure, misled, 
and unaccountable19 and, then, pitting them against the marginalized opponent. 
For example, Hyperides, in Against Demosthenes, says that: 
 
‚The People have always treated <us politicians in this way>: although 
stripped of their own crown by fortune, they have not stripped us of the one 
they awarded. When the people have behaved towards us in this way, 
shouldn’t we render all the service that is rightfully due them and, if need be, 
die for them? But you <acted> against the interests of the people.‛20 
 
Treating the people as the nodal point and flattering them21 was a safe way to 
ask for their good will. For this tactic to be effective, the interpellation of this 
group as homogeneous and pure was a prerequisite. 
 
 
Interpellation of the ‘People’ 
 
In Athenian forensic speeches, it is not uncommon for litigants to refer to the 
judges as to one single unit, all belonging in the same group; as if the same people 
                                                          
17. Demosthenes (speech) 45 (section) 6, to be cited as Dem. 45.6. 
18. Edward M. Harris, ‚Law and Oratory,‛ in Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. 
Ian Worthington, (London: Routledge, 1994), 137. 
19. Dem. 18.208, 18.277; Dem. 22.11; 23.97; Aeschines (to be cited as Aes.) 3.142, 3.231. 
20. Hyperides (to be cited as Hyp.) 5.30. 
21. E.g. Hyp. 4.33. 
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who sit in the court judging the particular case, also sit in the Assembly during 
any (past or future) debate, exhibiting the same behavioral traits and 
characteristics22. Judges are addressed in the second person plural, being 
distinguished from other groups such as the generals and politicians. For 
example, in Hyperides 5, fr. 6 it is said: ‚Gentlemen of the jury, you readily allow 
the generals and politicians to make large profits, not because the laws grant 
them this right but because of your indulgence and generosity.‛ Demosthenes 
uses similar arguments referring to a homogeneous group mentality23 and 
suggests that his opponents have gotten ‚you *Athenian people+ into the habit of 
losing confidence in yourselves and admiring one or two men.‛24 
The People sitting in court are presented as the nodal point of Athenian 
politics. This is characteristic of modern populist rhetoric25, yet in the direct 
democracy of Athens it was certainly true in its most literal sense. There, every 
proposal, by law, had to promote the best interests of the people. Legal actions 
could be brought for misleading the Athenian demos26 which had the ultimate 
decision-making power in the Assembly. Also, the segment of the demos sitting 
in court had the power of a final, unappealable, verdict. Hyperides, 
acknowledging this fact, criticizes his opponent Philippides for not treating the 
                                                          
22. The extent to which the judges sitting in courts represented the demos of the 
Athenians has caused some controversy, though it is likely that judges were mainly taken 
as representing the demos; on the relevance of synecdoche for relations between the 
demos and smaller groups representing it, see Josiah Ober, The Athenian Revolution: Essays 
on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996): 118-9; cf. Paul Cartledge, Democracy: A Life, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 
17. However, judges swore an oath individually (the Heliastic oath) and voted 
individually. See A.J.L. Blanshard, ‚What Counts as the demos? Some Notes on the 
Relationship between the Jury and "The People" in Classical Athens,‛ Phoenix 58 (2004): 32. 
23. Dem. 23.206. 
24. Dem. 23.210; cf. Aes. 3.178. 
25. Yiannis Stavrakakis & Georgios Katsambekis, ‘Left-wing populism in the European 
periphery: the case of SYRIZA’ in Journal of Political Ideologies, 19.2 (2014), 119-142. 
26. I use the ‘People’ and the ‘Demos’ interchangeably, although the latter might be 
seen as a more clearly and restrictively delineated group. In modern discourse, the 
‘People’ refers to a homogeneous, almost transcendent, group which might include people 
with no right to vote, such as minors and immigrants (although the latter are usually – in 
Right wing populist rhetoric - presented as outsiders who assist in the binary definition of 
the ‘People’). The ‘Demos’ on the other hand was a group clearly defined by law and, 
thus, its interpellation was easier. Yet, appeals to the ‘Demos’ in Athens shared many 
common features with appeals to the ‘People’ in modern populist discourse. Cf. references 
to the demos in the Athenaion Politeia, in the Old Oligarch ([Pseudo-Xenophon], 
Constitution of the Athenians) and in Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, usually 
describe a rigid polarization between the nobles and the mass of the people, the latter term 
referring to the unprivileged (Peter J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion 
Politeia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 88, 97. 
Vol. X, No. Y Adamidis: Populist Rhetorical Strategies in the … 
 
6 
People as the nodal and powerful point of Athenian politics; instead, he says, 
Philippides chose to affiliate himself with their enemies: 
 
‚For you have not laid up for yourself any good will with the people of 
Athens but have invested elsewhere, and you thought of flattering only those 
who strike fear in the people, not those who now have the power to save 
you.‛27 
 
The people, frequently referred to as the ‘Many’ (bringing in mind the 
modern populist discourse), have emerged since the fifth century as the dominant 
unit of Athenian politics28. The democracy could be defined, in Aristotle’s words, 
as the rule of the ‘Many’, predominantly poor, now interpellated in one single 
unit29. This was reflected in the forensic rhetoric too. Demosthenes, in order both 
to create a sense of group identity among the judges and to convince them to 
decide against the honors proposed for the general Charidemus by his opponent, 
has the speaker saying that ‚in the past the city was wealthy and famous in 
public, but no one in private rose above the Many‛30 before criticizing the current 
state of affairs whereby the few enrich themselves at the expense of the people. 
The ‘Many’ are pure and unaccountable; they are deceived by the shrewd 
politicians31. 
A further method that speakers implemented for interpellating the People 
was to create the fiction that the segment of the demos before them was part of an 
abstract, timeless, and transcendent Athenian demos. Aeschines, says to the 
judges: ‚I shall provide your law, which you passed with the intention<‛,32 as if it 
                                                          
27. Hyp. 2.7; cf. Hyp. 4.29-30. 
28. Thucydides (2.37), in the Funeral Oration delivered in honor of the Athenian war 
dead, has Pericles saying that the ‘constitution is called a democracy because we govern in 
the interests of the majority, not just the few’. Cf. references to the demos as the Many in 
pseudo-Xenophon’s *Ath. Pol.]. Despite their regular bias, ancient sources usually describe 
a rigid polarisation between the nobles and the mass of the people with the term demos 
referring, as a norm, to the unprivileged; see Peter J. Rhodes,  A Commentary on the 
Aristotelian Atlenaion Politeia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981): 88, 97; cf. Martin 
Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of the Law: Law, Society, and Politics in 
Fifth-Century Athens, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986); 
W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1971). 
29. Aristotle Politics 1292a11. For manifestations of populism in late fifth century 
Athens, see Vasileios Adamidis, ‘Manifestations of populism in late 5th century Athens’, 
in New studies in law and history, eds. David. A. Frenkel & Norbert Varga, (Athens: Athens 
Institute for Education and Research, 2019), 11-28. 
30. Dem. 23.206. 
31. Dem. 23.97. 
32. Aes. 3.14. 
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was the same people who voted for this law in the Assembly33. Similarly, 
Demosthenes addresses the judges before him as if they were the ones who took 
certain decisions in the Assembly in the past34. In another case, Demosthenes, 
compares the heroic achievements of previous generations with those of the 
current one, referring to the latter as being accomplished by the people before 
him in the court:  
 
‚That is how your ancestors acted, and that is how you older men acted when 
the Thebans defeated the Spartans at Leuctra and tried to destroy them. You 
prevented it<You did not fear the power and reputation of Thebans<you 
showed all Greeks that when someone wrongs you in public policy you 
should look to the standards of your forebears‛35.  
 
Such references were not always the case as, at times, speakers distinguish 
between the different sets of men taking the decisions. Yet, they still refer to them 
as a homogeneous group that should behave as belonging to the timeless group 
of Athenian citizens:  
 
‚Even if it was one set of men who were saved and granted the exemption, 
but you, who are the ones now taking it away, constitute a different group, 
that does not remove the stain on your reputation‛36.  
 
This brings us to the next point which is the putative ethical homogeneity 
among the generations of the timeless Athenian demos. References to the 
Athenian ancestors were frequent and, inter alia, served the objective of the 
further interpellation of the group. Speakers present themselves as adhering to 
these values, which the opponent subverts, urging the judges to demonstrate 
their loyalty to their ancestors and the Athenian tradition by punishing the 
dissenter37. Demosthenes, defending his record of policy proposals, argues that 
these aligned with the practices of the ancestors that shaped the Athenian 
character. Referring to various incidents of the distant and recent past38 that 
reveal the disposition of the Athenians39, justifies his policies by arguing that: 
‚Since I had seen so many instances of this kind where the city was ready to fight 
                                                          
33. Cf. Aes. 3.37, 3.232. 
34. Dem. 20.12. 
35. Dem. 18.98-99; cf. 18.96; Dem. 20.60, 20.68, 20.72, 20.86, 20.109; 22.6, 22.10. For the 
rhetorical techniques followed by the Attic orators when using examples from the past, 
see Giulia Maltagliati, ‚Persuasion through proximity (and distance) in the Attic orators’ 
Historical Examples,‛ Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 60, No. 1 (2020): 68-97. 
36. Dem. 20.47. 
37. Aes. 3.112, 3.231. 
38. Dem. 18.96-101. 
39. Dem. 18.100. 
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for the interests of others, what was I to urge the city to do, what was I to 
advise?‛40 Ancestors, judges and Demosthenes adhere to common values, while 
Aeschines, who criticized Demosthenes for these policies, stands on the opposite 
side.  
Speakers, appealing for conformity with the practices of the past that made 
Athens great, invite the audience not to deviate from their ancestors’ tradition41. 
Aeschines, advising the audience not to honor Demosthenes by awarding him a 
crown for exceptional services to the city, contrasts the ancestral practices to the 
current situation:   
 
‚If anyone were to ask you whether in your opinion the city is more 
renowned at the present time or in our ancestors’ time, you would all agree 
that it was in our ancestors’ time. And were men better then or now? Then 
they were outstanding, now they are far inferior. And were the awards and 
crowns and proclamations and free meals in the Prytaneum more plentiful 
then than now? In those days distinctions were scarce in our city, and the 
name of virtue was an honor. Now the whole practice has been completely 
discredited, and you give crowns out of habit, not on purpose‛42.  
 
The invocation of political ideals could further assist in the interpellation. 
Adherence to the rule of law was a widely acknowledged Athenian value 
stemming from the Athenian tradition. Demosthenes says that  
 
‚our ancestors founded this court of law not so that we litigants could gather 
you together and then hurl the proscribed slurs at each other for personal 
reasons but to convict someone who may have committed a crime against 
the city. Aeschines knows this as well as I, yet rather than accuse, he has 
chosen to abuse‛43.  
 
Once again, the values and norms of the homogeneous Athenian demos are 
respected by the speaker, thus establishing concord44 and demonstrating loyalty 
to the ancestral institutions, while alienating the opponent who abuses and 
subverts Athenian tradition45. 
                                                          
40. Dem. 18.101. 
41 Tradition as a type of legal argument is discussed in Wilson Huhn, The Five Types 
of Legal Argument, (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2014): 45-50. 
42. Aes. 3.178; for a very similar argument, cf. Dem. 23.196, 23.204, 23.211. 
43. Dem. 18.123-4. 
44. Dem 18.280. 
45. This establishment of concord in order to provoke the friendly disposition of the 
audience is also suggested by Aristotle (e.g. Rhetoric 1381a, Nic. Eth. 1167a−b). This 
technique, aiming at the establishment of a special relationship of concord and unanimity 
between the speaker and the audience, is evident from Homer onwards. Although it is not 
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Another frequently invoked part of the Athenian legal tradition was the 
persona of the ‘lawgiver’46. Orators often resort to the authority of the lawgivers 
of the past, a topos of Athenian oratory, in order to support their case47. References 
to Solon and Draco reveal the timelessness and merit of Athenian laws, making 
each verdict of historical importance48. Judges, envisaged as representatives of the 
timeless and transcendent demos, stand in the court of history before the persona 
of the glorified lawgivers. Being the expressers and interpreters of the lawgivers’ 
intent, judges belong to a venerated group with shared identity and values. 
Credit is reserved for the lawgivers, not for any public service except that they 
enacted beneficial and well-conceived statutes49, these being the ‘currency of the 
state’ and, therefore, if anyone debased that currency and introduced counterfeit, 
the court had graver reason to abhor and punish that man50. With a single 
argument, the group of Athenian judges is interpellated, the opponent is 
alienated and the speaker is presented as the defender of the Athenian values51. 
The authority-figure of the ‘ideal lawgiver’ demonstrated the ethical coherence of 
Athenian laws and the legal system’s almost mystical continuity through time. 
This imagined figure impersonated the ethical prototype of the Athenian legal 
system, persuading the judges to interpret the Athenian laws, as far as possible 
uniformly, by reference to his demands52. As Aeschines urges them to do, 
combining the authority of the lawgivers with that of the ancestors: 
                                                                                                                                                         
evident solely in forensic settings (cf. Aristophanes Wasps; James F. McGlew, ‚Speak on 
my Behalf‛: Persuasion and Purification in Aristophanes’ Wasps‛, Arethusa 37 (2004): 
11−36.), it is in the Attic orators that it achieved its perfection (e.g. Antiphon 1.4; Dem. 
18.280-1, 18.287,18. 292-3; 20.4, 20.14; 23.6, 23.163-6, 23.173-4, 23.184, 23.194; 24.24, 24.38; cf. 
Adamidis, Character Evidence, chapter 1. 
46. Michael Gagarin, ‚Storytelling about the Lawgiver in the Athenian Orators,‛ CEA 
(2020): 33. On Greek lawgivers, see Szegedy-Maszak, A., ‚Legends of the Greek 
Lawgivers,‛ GRBS 19 (1978): 199-209; on Solon, see Edward M. Harris, ‚Solon and the 
Spirit of the Law in Archaic and Classical Greece,‛ in Democracy and the Rule of Law in 
Classical Athens, edited by E. M. Harris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 3-
29 and Vasileios Adamidis, ‚Solon the Lawgiver: Inequality of Resources and Equality 
before the Law,‛ in the Role of law, human rights and social justice, justice systems, commerce, 
and law curriculum: selected issues, edited by David A. Frenkel (Athens: ATINER, 2017): 121-
138. 
47. E.g. Aes. 3.2, 3.6, 3.22, 3.26, 3.31, 3.33, 3.38; Dem. 20.89-93; 23.27; 24.38. 
48. On the historical importance of decisions, see: Aes. 3.6-7, 3.14, 3.108, 3.112, 3.175, 
3.178; Dem. 20.12,20. 89-93, 20.135, 20.142, 20.154; 22.35,22. 94-99; 24.38. 
49. Dem. 24.211. 
50. Dem. 24.213. 
51. Cf. Aes. 3.175, Dem. 20.94; 24.38. 
52. On the figure of the ‘ideal lawgiver’ and its implications see Stephen Johnstone, 
Disputes and Democracy: the Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1999), 25−33; cf. Edward M. Harris, ‚Solon and the Spirit of the Law in 
Archaic Athens,‛ in Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society, 
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‚*i+magine that you *judges+ see on the platform where I now stand as I 
speak the city’s benefactors ranged against their *Demosthenes and his 
supporting speakers] impudence. See Solon, who equipped the democracy 
with the noblest laws, a philosopher and a worthy legislator, urging you in 
the restrained manner that befits him under no circumstances to set more 
value on Demosthenes’s arguments than on your oaths and the laws. See 
Aristides<expressing his anger at the insult to justice<‛53.  
 
Judges, as a group, ought to protect Athenian legal tradition. Demosthenes 
claims that Timocrates’s law ‚robs the Courts of Justice, which are the pillars of 
the constitution, of all power to impose the additional penalties attached by the 
laws to transgressions‛54. He argues that: ‚the question for you today is this: shall 
all the laws you have enacted for the restraint of the wrongdoers be invalidated 
and this law alone be valid?‛55 In support of his argument, Demosthenes 
highlights the antiquity of these ‚old-established‛ and ‚well-tried‛ laws56 which 
have been repeatedly tested and found advantageous, against the brand new law 
of Timocrates which threatens to destroy them57. According to him, ‚such a 
lawgiver merits the severest punishment<to prevent another man from coming 
forward to overthrow the most powerful institutions with a fresh statute‛58.  
The orators attribute the prosperity of Athens, her liberty, and her democracy 
to her laws that the judges are asked, as a group, to defend59. To the question 
‚what is then the only honest and trustworthy safeguard of the law‛, 
Demosthenes replies: ‚you, the common people‛60. Judges are frequently 
reminded to vote in accordance with the law, especially by reference to the 
Heliastic oath, another institution enforcing the common bonds and shared 
identity of Athenians61. Demosthenes warns the judges that: 
                                                                                                                                                         
and Politics, ed. Edward M. Harris, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 3−28. I 
borrowed the notion of the ‘authority-figure’ from Douglas L. Cairns, Aidōs: the psychology 
and ethics of honor and shame in ancient Greek literature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 39, since I 
find its application to the Athenian legal system’s context with its frequent invocation of 
the ‘ideal lawgiver’ suitable. 
53. Aes. 3.257-8. 
54. Dem. 24.2. 
55. Dem. 24.5. 
56. Dem. 24.24. 
57. Dem. 24.137, 24.142. 
58. Dem. 24.153. 
59. Dem. 24.5. 
60. Dem. 24.37. 
61. Careful analysis of the court speeches reveals that references to the Heliastic oath 
weighed significantly to the minds of the jurors. On the statistics of the Heliastic oath in 
forensic speeches, see Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy, 33−45; Regarding the role and 
effect of the dikastic oath in Athenian courts, see Edward M. Harris, ‘The rule of law in 
Athenian democracy. Reflections on the judicial oath’, Dike 8 (2008): 157−81, contra 
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‚Now, you need to consider whether you value the constitution and the 
established laws and obedience to your oath as highly as this sum of money. If 
you are going to acquit a man who has obviously made an illegal proposal in 
this way, everyone will think you have chosen the sum of money over your 
laws and obedience to your oath<remember your oath and keep in mind the 
indictment: the issue now is not about collecting taxes but whether the laws 
should have authority‛62. 
 
Counter-interpellation, namely uniting the group by denouncing a common 
enemy, is also evident in the speeches. This common enemy is, naturally, the 
opponent, who poses a threat to the people and the democracy. Aeschines urges 
the judges to: 
 
‚*h+ate people who draft illegal decrees and regard no offence of this sort as 
insignificant but attach great importance to every one of them. And you 
should not allow any man to deprive you of this right, neither the supporting 
speeches from generals who have been colluding with certain public speakers 
to harm the constitution, nor the entreaties of foreigners, whom some people 
bring to stand and so get off free from the courts, even though their political 
conduct contravenes the laws. No, just as each of you would be ashamed to 
desert the post assigned to him in war, so now you should feel ashamed to 
desert the post of guardians of the democracy that the laws have assigned to 
you today< the whole citizen body has placed the city in your care and 
entrusted the constitution to you‛63. 
 
Demosthenes, setting boundaries between the citizens and the politicians 
and clearly designating the two distinct, opposing groups, says that: 
 
‚in private life there is such an excessive amount of private wealth belonging 
to men who conduct public business that they have constructed private 
houses more impressive than many public buildings, and some have bought 
up more land than all of you in the court possess<the men who manage our 
public affairs go from poverty to riches and supply themselves with plentiful 
livelihood for a long time. But you do not have enough money in the public 
treasury to supply even a day’s travel expenses. In the past, the people were 
the master of the politicians but now they are their servants. The people who 
propose decrees like this one are responsible<‛64.  
                                                                                                                                                         
Matthew R. Christ, The Litigious Athenian (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998), 194−6. 
62. Dem. 20.45-46. 
63. Aes. 3.6-7. 
64. Dem. 23.208-9; cf. Hyp. 4.36-8. 
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The two groups were clearly distinguished: on the one hand, the pure 
People, interpellated by reference to noble objectives and shared values; on the 
other, the opponent, quite often presented as a member of the political or 
economic establishment65. The ground was paved for the second part of the 





The interpellation of the ‘pure’ People was the first step for the implementation 
of the populist rhetorical strategy of litigants. Defining and setting the criteria for 
the membership of this group, allowed the speaker to indicate adherents and 
outsiders66. The relationship between them represents an antagonistic struggle on 
a ‘friends and enemies’ basis (the populist cosmology), in accordance with Carl 
Schmitt’s influential distinction.67 The ultimate objective was, following a binary 
and Manichaeistic tactic, the exclusion of the opponent from the interpellated 
group. Following the interpellation which was given effect by reference to the 
shared, traditional values and norms, the opponent is accused of disrespecting 
and subverting them.  
The most characteristic type of populist division is setting the common 
people against the political elite. Although the term rhetor (usually translated as 
‘public speaker’ or ‘politician’ to conform to modern politics) could be used either 
in a neutral or in a negative way depending on the speaker’s viewpoint68, the 
division between People and politicians is particularly evident in actions against 
illegal proposals where the accuser points to this capacity of the proposer. 
Hyperides suggests that such a division is envisaged by the law itself69 and 
argues for its validity throughout the speech70. Euxenippus, on whose behalf 
Hyperides speaks, is presented as a common citizen in order to be distinguished 
                                                          
65. Hyp. 4.32; Dem. 18.109; 20.1, 20.157; 22.42, 22.59. 
66. The essential features of the populist ontology involve ‘the people’ and ‘the out-
group(s)’. See Paul Taggart, ‚Populism and ‘Unpolitics’,‛ in Populism and the Crisis of 
Democracy, Vol. 1: Concepts and Theory, edited by G. Fitzi, J. Mackert, and B.S. Turner, 
(Lonsycopdon: Routledge, 2018): 79-80. 
67. Carlos De La Torre and O. Mazzoleni, ‚Do We Need a Minimum Definition of 
Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization,‛ Populism 2, no. 1 (2020): 81-82. 
68. Compare Dem. 24, written in 353 B.C.E. when Demosthenes was still at a young 
age, with Dem. 18 where Demosthenes defends his lifetime’s career as a statesman. Cf. 
Mogens H. Hansen, ‚The Athenian ‘Politicians’, 403-322 B.C.,‛ Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
Studies 24 (1983): 33-55; Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, Translated by Ian Worthington, 
Craig Cooper and Edward M. Harris, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 104, n.4. 
69. Hyp. 4.4, 4.8. 
70. Hyp. 4.36-8; cf. 5.12; cf. Hyp. fr. 80. 
Athens Journal of History XY 
 
13 
from the rhetores71. It was certainly immoral for the prosecutor, Polyeuctus, to 
‚prosecute private citizens<but *he+ should prosecute a politician<or impeach a 
general‛72.  
Aeschines, refers to a ‚group that views politics as no longer a public activity 
but their own private preserve‛, scheming ‚to enslave ordinary men and 
maintain their own despotic power‛73. In order to create a rift on the opponents’ 
rhetorical strategy, still playing on this – evidently – popular theme, he says that 
Ctesiphon, the accused, ‚says that he is not afraid on his own account (he says he 
expects to be seen as an ordinary man (ἰδιώτης), but that what makes him afraid 
is Demosthenes’s venality in political life‛74 who, not missing a single day to 
engage in politics has marked himself as a ‚professional and a hireling‛75. Judges 
should follow their ancestors’ practice who ‚gave the credit for the glorious and 
brilliant achievements to the people but blamed humiliations and failures on 
shabby politicians‛76. Otherwise, the judge, when he leaves the court, will realize 
that he: 
 
‚*w+ill have weakened himself and strengthened the politician. In a 
democratic city, the ordinary man has a king’s power through the law and 
his vote< The fact that in the present circumstances, you the Many are 
abandoning the bastions of democracy to the Few, I cannot approve<Won’t 
you keep the politicians under your control?‛77  
 
Unsurprisingly, given the popularity of this rhetoric, Demosthenes resorts to 
similar argumentation when it suits his aims. Replying to Aeschines, conforming 
to the populist ‘anti-politicians’ rhetoric, he says that:  
 
‚*h+e calls me a skillful speaker, a sorcerer, a sophist, and other such names. 
He hopes that by preemptively ascribing his own attributes to another, this 
description will be accepted, and the audience will not consider any further 
what kind of person is saying these things‛78. 
  
In Against Androtion Demosthenes argues against the group of men who are 
eloquent and bold, mislead the people and might try to overthrow the 
democracy79. He advises the judges:  
                                                          
71. Hyp. 4.13. 
72. Hyp. 4.27. 
73. Aes. 3.3, 3.20. 
74. Aes. 3.214. 
75. Aes. 3.220; cf. Dem. 22.4, 22.25, 22.32; 23.5. 
76. Aes. 3.231; cf. Dem. 23.199. 
77. Aes. 3.231-5. 
78. Dem. 18.276. 
79. Dem. 22.31-2. 
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‚*i+f you acquit, the Council house will fall into the hands of those who make 
speeches, but if you convict, into the hands of ordinary citizens<If this will 
happen and you get rid of the usual gang of orators, you will see everything 
works as it should, men of Athens‛80.  
 
In Against Aristocrates, Demosthenes has Euthycles saying that ‚you would 
be justified, men of Athens, in paying attention to me and to listening favorably to 
what I say. I am not one of those people who pester you, nor am I one of those 
politicians who enjoy your confidence‛81. It is the politicians who have misled the 
people, so Euthycles hesitated to bring an action as ‚even though speaking the 
truth, I *he+ would have less influence than many people telling you lies‛82. The 
city has been damaged ‚because of the depravity of the cursed and god-forsaken 
politicians ready to propose decrees like this‛83. In Against Timocrates, 
Demosthenes argues that the people are ‚far more magnanimous than the 
politicians‛84 as:  
 
‚*p+oliticians rarely let a month go by without legislating to suit their private 
ends. When in office they are always haling private citizens to jail; but they 
disapprove of the application of the same measure of justice to 
themselves<if you *judges+ decline to punish the men before you, in a very 
little time the People will be in slavery to those beasts of prey‛85.  
 
As in modern discourse, politicians (and, naturally, the opponent is 
presented as such) are presented as corrupt. Inexpedient advice, changes in the 
attitude, and putatively inconsistent behavior, were all attributed to corruption 
rather than to a change of mind or circumstances86. Referring to the Harpalus 
affair, Hyperides scolds the Athenian people for allowing ‚generals and 
politicians to make large profits‛87 whom Harpalus bribed for political reasons88. 
This was not the first time that Demosthenes was accused of being bribed89 nor 
was it surprising that Demosthenes retaliated in the same way90. Yet, the 
centrality of such allegations in the litigants’ discourse proves the credibility of 
such allegations for the Athenian judges. Therefore, having interpellated the 
                                                          
80. Dem. 22.37. 
81. Dem. 23.4; cf. 21.189. 
82. Dem. 23.188. 
83. Dem. 23.201. 
84. Dem. 24.123. 
85. Dem. 24.143; cf. 24.155-7, 24.193, 24.198. 
86. Adamidis, Character Evidence, 121. 
87. Hyp. 5.25. 
88. Hyp. 5.12, 5.24. 
89. Cf. Aes. 3. 92, 3.94, 3.103, 3.113. 
90. Dem. 18.49, 18.52, 18.131, 18.284, 18.295-7, 18.307, 18.313, 18.320. 
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People as a group distinct from politicians and classifying the opponent as such, 
evidently, was an effective way to marginalize him, which was the ultimate 
objective.  
For this to be achieved, the opponent had to be presented, using – at times – 
aggressive rhetoric, as an ethical outsider who does not adhere to the values and 
norms defining the group. Arguing against Ctesiphon, Aeschines urges the 
Athenians to ‚hate people who draft illegal decrees‛91 such as his opponent. 
Ctesiphon (and Demosthenes) aim to ‚deceive the audience, harm the city, and 
overthrow the democratic constitution‛92. When Ctesiphon calls Demosthenes as 
a supporting speaker, judges: 
 
‚*s+hould not listen to a sophist who thinks he will annul the laws with 
clever phrases, and none should count it virtuous, when Ctesiphon asks if he 
may call Demosthenes, to be the first to shout put: ‚Call him, call him‛; you 
are calling him against yourself, against the laws, against the democratic 
constitution‛93.  
 
‚As to his tears and his shrill voice, when he asks you: ‘Where shall I find 
refuge, men of Athens? Shut me out of public life and there’s nowhere for me 
to fly’, you must answer him in turn: ‘And the Athenian people – where are 
they to find refuge, Demosthenes?’‛94, thus clearly separating Demosthenes 
from the people95. Demosthenes, in turn, claims that it is actually Aeschines 
who dissents from Athenian practices and should be seen as an outsider: ‚To 
be sure, it is not acceptable to try to rob someone of access to the people and 
the opportunity to address them and especially to do that out of spite and 
malice – it’s not right by god, nor, Athenians, is it just or in accord with civic 
practice‛96.  
 
Aeschines should actually be seen as the ‚prototype of ethical outsider of 
Athenian courts‛97, namely as a sycophant98, and may he ‚be destroyed, first of 
all, by the gods but also by all these people, since you are [he is] a miserable 
citizen and a miserable bit-part actor‛99. He should be regarded as an outsider 
since ‚the valuable thing is not a politician’s words or the quality of his voice, but 
his pursuit of the same policy as the masses and his having the same friends and 
                                                          
91. Aes. 3.7. 
92. Aes. 3.200. 
93. Aes. 3.202. 
94. Aes. 3.209. 
95. Cf. Hyp. 5.12. 
96. Dem. 18.13; cf. 18.34; pace Dem. 24.171. 
97. Adamidis, Character Evidence, 186 with n. 109; cf. Christ, Litigious Athenian, 50ff. 
98. Dem. 18.112-3; cf. 18.121-6. 
99. Dem. 18.267. 
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enemies as his country‛100. Similarly, Hyperides attacks Philippides because he 
‚had not laid up for yourself *himself+ any good will with the people of 
Athens<condemned to death this ancient city<kept a close watch on the city’s 
fortunes, to see whether an opportunity might arise to say or do anything against 
the people‛101. Acting undemocratically, disrespecting the sovereignty of the 
people, ‚he thinks that he can give the people orders‛102. The binary was present; 
boundaries were clearly designated and the division between the homogeneous 
people and the opponent-politician was highlighted. 
In this division, the opponent was presented as not adhering to those 
venerated values that defined the identity of the interpellated group. 
Demosthenes’s speech Against Timocrates in an action against a putatively 
inexpedient law is indicative: Timocrates goes against the courts, the laws, the 
democracy, the city, the people, and the lawgivers, namely the foundations of 
Athenian identity. His proposed law ‚robs the Courts of Justice, which are the 
pillars of the constitution, of their powers‛103 and has their verdicts overruled104. It 
invalidates ‚all the laws that you [People] have enacted for the restraint of 
evildoers‛105. It is ‚inconsistent with all existing statutes‛106, so Demosthenes is 
wondering ‚how, indeed, could any private person ill-treat the State more 
gravely than by subverting the laws by which the State is administered?‛107 Such a 
person is an enemy of the people and the democracy108; he deserves to suffer any 
punishment as an opponent of the city109. Obviously, such a lawgiver as 
Timocrates, has nothing in common with wise Athenian lawgivers like Solon110 or 
his laws that he tries to repeal111. Throughout the speech, Timocrates is portrayed 
as an outsider, a person who does not respect the values, traditions, and norms of 
the interpellated group of the Athenian people. This rhetorical technique can be 
further illustrated by reference to passages placing the opponent in opposition to 
the ancestors112, the oaths113 and even the gods114. The objective, nonetheless, 
                                                          
100. Dem. 18.280. 
101. Hyp. 2.7-8. 
102. Hyp. 2.10; cf. Hyp. 4.20. 
103. Dem. 24.2; for a similar argument pitting the opponent against the court, see 
Aes. 3.53. 
104. Dem. 24.73. 
105. Dem. 24.5. 
106. Dem. 24.33. 
107. Dem. 24.31; for a similar rhetorical technique, namely alienating the opponent 
from the audience by pitting him against the laws, see Aes. 3.4, 3.8, 3.16, 3.31, 3.35-7; Dem. 
22.7, 22.11, 22.32, 22.45; 23.34, 23.62. 
108. Dem. 24.57; cf. Dem. 22.32; 23.3, 23.98, 23.151, 23.185-8, 199; Aes. 3.8, 3.200, 3.209. 
109. Dem. 24.95; cf. Hyp. 2.7-8. 
110. Dem. 24.55, 24.103-6. 
111. Dem. 24.142; for similar arguments pitting the opponent against the lawgivers, 
see Dem. 20.103, 20.158; 22.31; 23.73, 23.89; cf. Aes. 3.11. 
112. Dem. 23.70. 
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remains the same: excluding the opponent from the homogenous and ethically 
coherent People, marginalizing and alienating him in a Manichaeistic way, 
presenting him as a subverter of the foundations of the Athenian identity and 





The rhetorical strategies of Athenian litigants shared common characteristics 
with modern populist discourse, whose main aim is to present a fictitious 
division between an artfully created pure and homogeneous People and an evil 
‘out-group’. References of the litigants to the dicasts as a segment of the morally 
pure and homogeneous Athenian demos aimed at securing their good will and 
establish concord. Speakers demonstrated their adherence to the traditional 
norms which defined Athenian identity, thus identifying themselves with the 
morally upright audience. 
The group of dicasts was presented as an integral part of the abstract and 
timeless Athenian demos whose interests were endangered by the opponent. The 
veneration of the populace and the clear dichotomy between adherents and 
outsiders, achieved by artful rhetoric, paved the ground for the marginalization 
of the opponent who was presented as an outsider, dangerous for the values and 
the integrity of the group. In practical terms, aggressive and anti-pluralist rhetoric 
aimed at the incitement of thorubos, which impeded the opponent from stating his 
case. This Manichaeistic approach of Athenian litigants, similar to the rhetorical 
strategies employed in modern populism, can certainly enlighten students of 
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